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INTRODUCTION
A typical Administrative Law course presents the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.) as
establishing the rule that statutory text quite close to the magic words, "on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,"' is needed to trigger
the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) formal hearing requirements for
a rulemaking.3 Florida East Coast Railway is a prime example of an
underrated case because, even though the case is well known, its renown is
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law,
University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D. 1984, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1978,
Williams College. My thanks to Russ Weaver for the invitation to participate in the
Administrative Law Discussion Forum.
1. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
3. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 238.
4. See, e.g., John M. Rogers, Michael P. Healy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Administrative Law 226 (2003) (including Florida East Coast Railway as a lead case on the
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a consequence only of its black letter rule about rulemaking procedures.
Many scholars and practitioners do not appreciate the case for illuminating
three important and fundamental principles of administrative law: the
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication, the significance of the
organic statute and the APA in determining the content of administrative
law, and the interrelationship of the three branches of government in
defining administrative law. In this last respect, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court is a striking example of the significance and vagaries
of statutory interpretation.
I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE DECISION
William Rehnquist often relied on historical context to deternine the
content of legal requirements.5 Although his narrative in Florida East
Coast Railway appears to place the action of the agency into a historical
context for understanding the legal issue, that history does not inform the
decision in a way that it might have.6 The story is one in which Congress
amended the Interstate Commerce Act in 1966 to delegate to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) the authority to remedy a national shortage
of railroad freight cars.7 Specifically, Congress amended § l(14)(a) to
"enlarge[] the Commission's authority to prescribe per diem charges for the
use by one railroad of freight cars owned by another." 8 The ICC waited a
year before taking action to exercise the new power delegated by Congress,
and in December of 1967, the ICC required railroads to report to the ICC
about the demand for and the supply of freight cars over a period of about
one year beginning in January 1968.9 The railroads raised concerns about
this study and the ICC staff held an informal meeting with representatives
of twenty railroads. 10 This meeting "adjourned on a note that undoubtedly
left the impression that hearings would be held at some future date." 1
subject of the trigger for formal rulemaking).
5. See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517, 519-20, 530-31 (1990) (presenting the history of the Private Express Statutes to
demonstrate that Congress did not intend for the monopoly of the United States Postal
Service to protect the employment of Postal Service employees); Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States, 440 U.S. 668, 669-82 (1979) (presenting the history of land grants to the Union
Pacific Railroad, pursuant to the Union Pacific Act of 1862, to demonstrate that Congress
did not intend to reserve an implied easement for public access).
6. The story may have supported a conclusion that a congressional committee tried to
impose its view of the rulemaking procedures required by statute on the agency over which
the subcommittee was exercising oversight. See infra Part IV.A.
7. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 230.
8. See id. (citing Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 89-430, 80 Stat. 168 (1966)).
9. Id. at231.
10. Id. at231-32.
11. Id. at 232.
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The ICC duly collected information from the railroads and presented that
information to the Senate Committee on Commerce Subcommittee on
Surface Transportation in May of 1969.12 The Supreme Court quoted two
district court summaries of the Subcommittee's response to the agency's
appearance, one stating that "[c]omments were general that the
Commission was conducting too many hearings and taking too little action.
Senators pressed for more action and less talk ... The other, written by
Judge Friendly, stated that "Senators voiced displeasure at the
Commission's long delay at taking action under the 1966 amendment,
engaged in some merriment over what was regarded as an unintelligible
discussion of methodology.., and expressed doubt about the need for a
hearing."1 4 In both summaries, the district court opinions stated that the
ICC told Congress that it believed the agency lacked the power to regulate
without a hearing.1 5 The ICC indicated to the railroads that it would hold a
hearing after it collected the factual information.
16
Justice Rehnquist reported that, following this hearing, the ICC was
"apparently imbued with a new sense of mission.' 17 In December 1969,
the ICC issued a report and proposed regulation requiring railroads to pay
"'incentive' per diem charges" for the use of the box cars of another
railroad.18 The rates were incentive rates because their values were greater
than the amount needed to ensure a fair return to encourage prompt return
of the boxcars.' 9 The ICC also invited written responses to the report and
proposed regulations and informed interested parties requesting an oral
hearing that they needed to explain the need for a hearing.2 °
Four months later, in April 1970, the ICC modified several of the
conclusions included in the December 1969 report and denied the requests
for a hearing that several railroads submitted. 2' The ICC's final order
became effective on June 1, 1970.22
12. Id. at 232.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 232-33 (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 232.
17. Id. at 233.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 233-34.
21. See id. at 234.
22. See Long Island R.R. Co. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 491 n.1 (E.D.N.Y.
1970).
2006] 1041
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION
In Florida East Coast Railway, the Court considered the type of hearing
required before the ICC could impose incentive per diem rates. 23  An
important lesson of the case is that the nature of the hearing compelled by
the Constitution or by statute will depend on the nature of the agency
action: "The term 'hearing' in its legal context undoubtedly has a host of
meanings. Its meaning undoubtedly will vary, depending on whether it is
used in the context of a rulemaking-type proceeding or in the context of a
proceeding devoted to the adjudication of particular disputed facts. 24
The classic early pair of due process cases, Londoner v. Denver25 and Bi-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, shaped the Florida
26East Coast Railway Court's view of the varied hearing requirement. That
pair of cases establishes a core administrative law principle: Constitutional
due process does not require an individualized hearing when the
government engages in across-the-board, generalized determinations.27
Procedures that are helpful and required for resolving individualized,
adjudicative matters are not necessary when the issue being resolved by the
agency is a legislative sort involving broad policy determinations.
The Court's distinction in Londoner and Bi-Metallic also framed the
understanding of the hearing mandated by statute. The Court concluded
that the required procedures did not include an oral hearing because the
agency was not making individualized determinations.28 On this basis, the
Court distinguished the more onerous procedures that it required for the
adjudicative action that the ICC successfully challenged in ICC v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.29  In setting the incentive per diem
23. See Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 226-28.
24. Id. at 239 (footnote omitted). Although the procedural requirements for hearings
vary depending on the type of administrative action the agency has taken, the Court
suggested that the notice requirements are the same. See id. at 243-44 (concluding that
notice in Florida East Coast Railway was adequate and distinguishing Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938), on that basis, rather than holding that less precise notice is
required in a case of prospective rulemaking).
25. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
26. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
27. See id. at 445-46; Londoner, 210 U.S. at 378.
28. See Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445; Londoner, 210 U.S. at 378.
29. 227 U.S. 88 (1913). The Florida East Coast Railway Court described Louisville
& Nashville Railroad as follows:
[Louisville & Nashville Railroad] involved what the Court there described as a
"quasi-judicial" proceeding of a quite different nature from the one we review here.
The provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, and of
the Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584, in effect at the time that case was decided, left to the
railroad carriers the "primary right to make rates," 227 U.S., at 92, but granted to
the Commission the authority to set them aside, if after hearing, they were shown to
be unreasonable. The proceeding before the Commission in that case had been
instituted by the New Orleans Board of Trade complaint that certain class and
1042 [58:4
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rates, however, the Court found that the ICC was acting in a quasi-
legislative manner by promulgating prospective requirements with a broad
categorical impact. 30 The ICC's decision to reject the railroads' claims that
alternate rates should apply to them because of their particular
characteristics reinforced the categorical nature of the agency
determination.3'
The dissent agreed with the majority's analytic approach to determining
the procedural requirements for a hearing. The dissent distinguished the
Court's then recent decision in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
Corp.32 by arguing that the Court had accepted minimal procedures there
because the rulemaking being reviewed:
[Was] wholly legislative. We held that § 1(14)(a) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, requiring by its terms a "hearing," "does not require that
such rules 'be made on the record' within the meaning of § 553(c). We
recognized, however, that the precise words "on the record" are not
talismanic, but that the crucial question is whether the proceedings under
review are "an exercise of legislative rulemaking" or "adjudicatory
hearings." The "hearing" requirement of § 1(14)(a) cannot be given a
fixed and immutable meaning to be applied in each and every case
without regard to the nature of the proceedings.
33
The dissenters claimed that the ICC's regulatory action in Florida East
Coast Railway was more particularized in its financial impact and should
have triggered procedures that would ensure appropriate administrative
consideration of those individualized impacts.34
commodity rates charged by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad from New
Orleans to other points were unfair, unreasonable, and discriminatory. 227 U.S. at
90. The type of proceeding there, in which the Commission adjudicated a
complaint by a shipper that specified rates set by a carrier were unreasonable, was
sufficiently different from the nationwide incentive payments ordered to be made
by all railroads in this proceeding so as to make the Louisville & Nashville opinion
inapplicable in the case presently before us.
United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244 (1973).
30. See Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 246 ("The factual inferences were used in the
formulation of a basically legislative-type judgment, for prospective application only, rather
than in adjudicating a particular set of disputed facts.").
31. See id.
32. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
33. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 256, where Justice Douglas stated that:
Section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act bestows upon the Commission
broad discretionary power to determine incentive rates. These rates may have
devastating effects on a particular line, According to the brief of one of the
appellees, the amount of incentive compensation paid by debtor lines amounts to
millions of dollars each six-month period. Nevertheless, the courts must defer to
the Commission as long as its findings are supported by substantial evidence and it
has not abused its discretion. "All the more insistent is the need, when power has
been bestowed so freely, that the 'inexorable safeguard' . . . of a fair and open
hearing be maintained in its integrity." Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 304.
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Florida East Coast Railway confirms the basic principle that agencies
make two different types of decisions and that the proper procedures for
agency decisionmaking depend on the category of the decision being made.
That distinction between adjudication and rulemaking is so well established
that it defines the context for evaluating the adequacy of a hearing and the
nature of the hearing that Congress mandated. Categorizing the decision
may, however, be controversial and may reflect an underlying view of the
value of additional procedural requirements.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ORGANIC STATUTE AND THE APA IN
DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Florida East Coast Railway also nicely illustrates how the content of
administrative law is determined by the applicable organic act, in addition
to the default requirements of the APA. Although this principle is
straightforward, it may carry great legal significance. The Court had to
consider this characteristic of administrative law, after it had decided that
the Interstate Commerce Act did not trigger the formal hearing
requirements of the APA.35 The Court stated that:
even though the Commission was not required to comply with §§ 556
and 557 of that Act, it was required to accord the "hearing" specified in
§ 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Though the District Court did
not pass on this contention, it is so closely related to the claim based on
the APA that we proceed to decide it now.
3 6
The Court concluded that the organic act did not impose any hearing
requirements in addition to those required by § 553 of the APA.37
Accordingly, the Court held that the procedures followed by the ICC in the
rulemaking conflicted with neither the APA nor the organic act.38 In other
cases, of course, the organic act may establish procedural requirements that
supplement the requirements of the APA.3 9
35. See Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 238.
36. Id.
37. The Court's interpretation is discussed later in this article. See infra Part IV.B.
38. A third source of additional procedural requirements-the agency's own procedural
regulations-apparently did not require the ICC to accord additional hearing rights to the
railroads.
39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(5) (2000) (requiring for rulemaking an opportunity
for "oral presentation of data, views, or arguments" in addition to the Administrative
Procedure Act's (APA) requirements); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d
872, 876-77 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding, in an adjudicatory proceeding, that the Clean Water
Act requirement of "public hearing" compelled an oral hearing, even though the APA
requirements for a formal adjudication did not mandate an oral hearing); Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (relying on the organic act to supplement the standing granted
under the APA).
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IV. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE THREE BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT IN DEFINING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The final principle of administrative law presented in Florida East Coast
Railway is the significance of the interrelationship of the three branches of
government in defining the law. Florida East Coast Railway allows this
principle to be considered from two perspectives: the ability of Congress to
effect law independent of the enactment of legislation and the authority of
the judiciary to say what the law is. These perspectives will be discussed in
turn.
A. Ongoing, Non-Statutory Congressional Power Over Agencies
The controversy in Florida East Coast Railway required the resolution
of the question of what procedures applied to the ICC's promulgation of
regulations establishing incentive per diem rates. The ICC believed that
those procedural requirements included an oral hearing before the agency
at which railroads could present evidence about the need for and impact of
incentive per diem rates. This was the ICC's position at congressional
hearings reviewing the status of the per diem rates and the agency's actions
to define them.4 °
The Senate subcommittee reviewing the ICC's handling of the issue let
the agency know that it was quite unhappy about the slow pace of agency
action to resolve a problem that Congress had delegated to the agency for a
regulatory fix.4' The ICC's view was that it could promulgate a regulation
only after it held additional oral hearings.42
As part of the 1966 statutory delegation of rulemaking authority,
Congress had neither amended the long-standing requirement of the
Interstate Commerce Act that agency action be taken only "after hearing"
nor included any deadline for action or any trigger mechanism if the
agency failed to act by a particular date. 43 Instead, a single subcommittee
changed the agency's position about the need for a hearing by deriding the
slow pace of agency action at the congressional hearing.
Although this subcommittee action is far different than the legislative
veto that the Supreme Court famously found unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha,44 the effect appears to be a dubious attempt by a subgroup of the
legislature to determine the procedural requirements for the ICC hearing
40. See supra Part 1.
41. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
43. For examples of such statutory requirements, see 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000), in which
Congress barred land disposal of hazardous waste unless the agency defined treatment
standards for those wastes by a date defined in the statute.
44. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
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after the enactment of the statute requiring a hearing. A court may properly
criticize such non-statutory lawmaking by Congress, 45 but the Florida East
Coast Railway Court seemed wholly unmoved except for giving rise to a
humorous rhetorical turn.
46
In sum, the congressional subcommittee's efforts to change the ICC's
view of the law were lawful because the Court is the final arbiter both of
any limits on congressional control over agency lawmaking and of the
interpretation of statutes, the issue to which we now turn.
B. The Power of the Judiciary:
The Significance and Vagaries of Statutory Interpretation
Florida East Coast Railway stands as just one of numerous cases that
illustrate the power wielded by courts in determining the content of
American public law through the impact of statutory interpretation. The
extent of that power is limited, in theory. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.47 may be the most famous administrative
law case of the last quarter-century because it defines in clear terms the
requirement that courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes.4 8 Moreover, Chevron establishes the principle that
only congressional action that clearly defines the content of the law binds
an agency's authority to determine the content of the law. 49 Under this
principle, a court itself does not have a lawmaking role-at least when the
agency has intended to make law in accordance with procedures for making
law defined by Congress.5 °
45. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 365, 371 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (remanding to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which had modified the
proposed regulation based on comments disagreeing with the proposed regulation submitted
by members of Congress without any independent determination by the agency).
46. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 233 (1973) (following the
congressional hearing, the ICC was "apparently imbued with a new sense of mission").
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court established the following two-step
analysis of the legality of an agency's legal interpretation:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
48. See id. at 866.
49. See id. at 842-43.
50. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
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The more than twenty years that have passed since Chevron was decided
show, however, that courts retain significant lawmaking power even under
a doctrine of deference to agencies. Perhaps most importantly, a court has
the power to decide when Congress has spoken clearly in a statute. 51 In
such a case, Congress's clear statutory direction, as found by a court,
determines the content of the law.52
To be sure, the Court decided Florida East Coast Railway one decade
before Chevron. Florida East Coast Railway nevertheless presents, in a
different context, the issue of the extent of a court's authority to determine
the content of law. The Court's decision in Florida East Coast Railway
nicely illustrates the extent of judicial power because, when one contrasts
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court with the dissenting opinion of
Justice Douglas and the opinion of Judge Friendly in Long Island Railroad,
one can gauge the vagaries of statutory interpretation and the extent of
lawmaking discretion that a court may exercise in the guise of
interpretation.
I will focus on two aspects of the varied interpretative approaches to the
legal issue: the question of the statute that the Court is interpreting, and the
question of the relevant enacting Congress.
1. Which Statute?
Even before the Supreme Court decision in Chevron, courts accorded
varying degrees of deference to agency interpretations of law.53 In his
dissent in Florida East Coast Railway, Justice Douglas predictably urged
deference to the ICC's view (up until the time of the Senate subcommittee
hearing) that the Interstate Commerce Act required an oral hearing.54
Justice Rehnquist could not ignore the long tradition of deference to
agencies, but fashioned an interpretive approach that allowed him to avoid
the need to defer to the ICC's view that the statute required an oral hearing.
Justice Rehnquist concluded that courts did not owe the ICC deference
51. See Michael P. Healy, Textualism 's Limits on the Administrative State: Of lsolated
Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,928, 10,937-41 (2001).
52. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
53. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); NLRB v. Hearst
Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,130-31 (1944).
54. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 254-55 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("The Commission's order initiating the rulemaking proceeding notified the
parties that it was acting 'under authority of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49
U.S.C. § 1, et seq.); more particularly, section 1(14)(a) and the [APA] (5 U.S.C. §§ 553,
556, and 557).' Clearly, the Commission believed that it was required to hold a hearing on
the record. This interpretation, not of the [APA], but of § l(14)(a) of the Commission's
own Act, is 'entitled to great weight."') (footnote and citations omitted). Judge Friendly did
not formally defer to the ICC's view that a formal hearing was necessary, although he did
refer to the agency's position in concluding that the formal rulemaking procedures were
triggered by § l(14)(a). See Long Island R.R. Co. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490, 497-
98 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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because the ICC position that an oral hearing was needed was based on the
agency's understanding of the requirements of the APA, rather than the
Interstate Commerce Act. The majority did not defer to the ICC
interpretation of the APA because the ICC had neither expertise nor
delegated lawmaking authority for the interpretation of the APA's
requirements. 5
Florida East Coast Railway provides a sense of the vagaries of statutory
interpretation by showing that a court retains the ability, even in a legal
regime that mandates judicial deference, to define the limits on deference.56
That ability is plainly most important when a court has a different view of
the law than the agency.
2. Which Congress?
In addition to this disagreement about which statute the ICC had
interpreted, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the dissent and Judge
Friendly regarding the appropriate legislative intent used to determine the
procedural requirements for agency rulemaking. Although the Florida
East Coast Railway majority was able to resolve the APA formal hearing
trigger issue without deference to the ICC, the majority still had to decide
the nature of the hearing required by § 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act.57
Both Justice Douglas and Judge Friendly looked to the intent of the 1917
Congress, which initially had enacted § l(14)(a) and the "after hearing"
requirement. Justice Douglas, agreeing with Judge Friendly, concluded
that Congress was requiring a traditional hearing of the sort described in
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.58
55. Justice Rehnquist argued that:
The dissenting opinion ... relies in part on indications by the Commission that it
proposed to apply the more stringent standards of §§ 556 and 557 of the [APA] to
these proceedings. This Act is not legislation that the Interstate Commerce
Commission, or any other single agency, has primary responsibility for
administering. An agency interpretation involving, at least in part, the provisions
of that Act does not carry the weight, in ascertaining the intent of Congress, that an
interpretation by an agency "charged with the responsibility" of administering a
particular statute does.
Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 236 n.6 (citations omitted).
56. The Florida East Coast Railway Court interestingly ignores the question of
deference when it resolves the legal issue of whether the Interstate Commerce Act itself
required an oral hearing, see supra Part III, an issue as to which deference to the ICC would
have been proper.
57. See supra Part III.
58. See Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 254 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I would agree with
the District Court in Long Island R. Co., that Congress was fully cognizant of our decision
in Louisville & Nashville R. Co. when it first adopted the hearing requirement of § 1(14)(a)
in 1917.") (internal citation omitted).
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Justice Rehnquist, however, believed that the Congress whose intent
mattered was the 1966 Congress, which had amended § 1(14)(a) of the
Interstate Commerce Act to authorize the imposition of incentive rates,
although it had not amended the "after hearing" language in the first part of
§ 1(14)(a).59 This interpretive strategy allowed Justice Rehnquist to claim
that Congress, legislating in 1966, intended the required "hearing" to be
one that was suitable for the promulgation of a legislative rulemaking with
prospective effect, that is, the rulemaking procedures defined by the APA.
60
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the law was bolstered in two
important respects. First, because the intent of the 1917 Congress was
insignificant, the majority could ignore how people would have understood
the statutory term "hearing" at that time. Second, the Court saw the 1966
Congress as having known that the statutory term "hearing" had a specific
legal meaning in the context of a prospective rulemaking. In the Court's
view, Congress would have intended the term "hearing" to reflect the
procedural requirements for rulemaking in the APA. 61  Relying on the
intent of the 1966 Congress permitted Justice Rehnquist to avoid the charge
that his interpretation of the 1917 provision was anachronistic.
The interpretive disagreement reflected by these two different
approaches to the question of legislative intent in Florida East Coast
Railway is important for two reasons. First, the difference goes a long way
toward determining the interpretive result: It is likely that the 1917 and
1966 Congresses would have had different views of the hearing that the
ICC needed to provide before establishing per diem rates for cars. 62 If
legislative intent is seen as determining the content of the law,63 there may
59. See id. at 239-40 (discussing the intent of Congress when it promulgated the 1966
amendments of the Interstate Commerce Act).
60. See id. at 240-41.
61. See id. at 240 ("Under these circumstances, confronted with a grant of substantive
authority made after the [APA] was enacted, we think that reference to that Act, in which
Congress devoted itself exclusively to questions such as the nature and scope of hearings, is
a satisfactory basis for determining what is meant by the term 'hearing' used in another
statute. Turning to that Act, we are convinced that the term 'hearing' as used therein does
not necessarily embrace either the right to present evidence orally and to cross-examine
opposing witnesses, or the right to present oral argument to the agency's decisionmaker.")
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 241 ("We think this treatment of the term 'hearing' in the
[APA] affords a sufficient basis for concluding that the requirement of a 'hearing' contained
in § l(14)(a), in a situation where the Commission was acting under the 1966 statutory
rulemaking authority that Congress had conferred upon it, did not by its own force require
the Commission either to hear oral testimony, to permit cross-examination of Commission
witnesses, or to hear oral argument.").
62. Both of these Congresses likely would have intents that differ as well from the view
of the required rulemaking procedures held by the Senate Subcommittee in 1969 following a
lengthy period of agency inaction. See supra Part IV.A.
63. Justice Rehnquist was an intentionalist. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 228-29 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 319-26 (1985) (critiquing Justice Rehnquist's intentionalist approach
to statutory interpretation).
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be great importance to deciding which congressional intent should be
evaluated. Second, neither side makes a clear case that it has identified
correctly the proper Congress for finding intent. The fact that neither side
fully engages the position of the other on this question is implicit in the fact
that each side makes claims that the intent of the "other" Congress is either
uncertain 64 or consistent with the intent of the Congress that is the focus of
the particular approach.65 For a legal issue that may determine the
interpretive result and thus the content of public law, there does not appear
to be any straight-forward interpretive rule. The result is that a court has
considerable discretion in finding and applying the interpretive rules of its
choice.
CONCLUSION
Given the concerns of this Article, it is not necessary to decide who is
right or wrong in interpreting the statute. The decision's importance as a
teaching tool is that it illustrates that courts are the final arbiters of the
content of administrative law. Moreover, when defining law, courts have
an extensive array of devices for concluding that the law means one thing
or another.
Although students and practitioners of administrative law know the
Florida East Coast Railway case, they typically know only its rule
regarding the triggering of the APA's formal rulemaking procedures.
Because the rule of the case is so easily stated and because that rule has
significantly limited the application of formal rulemaking procedures,
students and practitioners have been less attentive to the other important
64. Justice Rehnquist argued that the intent of the 1917 Congress was unclear:
It is by no means apparent what the drafters of the Esch Car Service Act of 1917,
40 Stat. 101, which became the first part of § 1 (14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act, meant by the term. Such an intent would surely be an ephemeral one if,
indeed, Congress in 1917 had in mind anything more specific than the language it
actually used, for none of the parties refer to any legislative history that would shed
light on the intended meaning of the words "after hearing." What is apparent,
though, is that the term was used in granting authority to the Commission to make
rules and regulations of a prospective nature.
Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 239.
65. See id. at 254-55, where Justice Douglas argued in dissent that:
[Wlhen Congress debated the 1966 amendment that empowered the Commission to
adopt incentive per diem rates, it had not lost sight of the importance of hearings.
Questioned about the effect that incentive compensation might have on terminating
lines, Mr. Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce and floor manager of the bill, responded: "I might say to the gentleman
that this will not be put into practice until there have been full hearings before the
Commission and all sides have had an opportunity to argue and present their facts
on the question." 112 Cong. Rec. 10443 (emphasis added).
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insights into administrative law that the case offers. Florida East Coast
Railway is one of administrative law's most underrated cases, because of
the lessons about the fundamental structure of administrative law that the
case teaches.
